Accueil » Numéros » 2014/1 (Vol. 15) – Figures de l’entrepreneur » Beyond markets and hierarchies : an economic analysis of vertical quasi-integration

Beyond markets and hierarchies : an economic analysis of vertical quasi-integration

Virgile Chassagnon

Résumé

Les dynamiques industrielles du capitalisme sont liées aux transformations des structures organisationnelles de production. Ainsi, la firme verticalement intégrée à la Chandler s’est effacée au profit de firmes modernes désintégrées. Cette profonde transformation de l’environnement industriel, qui s’est manifestée dans les années 1980 et 1990, a conduit les firmes à développer de nouvelles stratégies de coopération inter-firmes et à faire émerger des formes de quasi-intégration verticale. L’objectif de cet article est d’analyser ces changements institutionnels à l’aune de la théorie économique. L’article se focalise sur les travaux originaux de trois auteurs influents qui ont développé leur propre approche de la quasi-intégration dans la seconde moitié du xx e siècle : Williamson, Houssiaux et Blois.

Plan

  • Introduction
  • Williamson, asset specificity and the realm of hybrids as the dominant organizational economic thought
  • Houssiaux as the founding father of the notion of quasi-integration
  • Blois and the integration of power and economic dependency in the analysis of quasi-integration
  • Conclusion

Article

[L’article peut être lu en intégralité sur Cairn]

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Mots-clés

Quasi-intégration verticale, Firme-réseau, Coopération inter-firmes, Pouvoir inter-firmes, Oliver E. Williamson, Jacques Houssiaux, Keith Blois