Accueil » Numéros » 2012/1 (Vol. 13) – Experimental economics: some methodological aspects » What to do with a problem like Duhem-Quine?

What to do with a problem like Duhem-Quine?

Martin K. Jones

Résumé

Le problème de Duhem-Quine a été considéré comme un problème majeur de la philosophie des sciences et a donné lieu au déploiement de nombreux efforts pour tenter de le circonvenir ou d’affaiblir ses implications. Plus récemment, le problème est devenu une question majeure au sein de la méthodologie de l’économie expérimentale. Dans cet article, l’auteur soutient que la plupart de ces discussions soit sacrifient trop du pouvoir explicatif de la science, soit ne réussissent pas à traiter proprement du problème. Dans le prolongement de discussions récentes en philosophie des sciences, on peut voir que le meilleur moyen de traiter du problème est de critiquer la conception même de la science développée par Quine.

Plan

  • Introduction
  • Quine’s critique of positivism
  • Response of experimental methodologists to the Duhem-Quine problem
  • Initial criticism of previous solutions to the Duhem-Quine problem
  • A critique of quine’s view of science
  • Conclusion

Article

[L’article peut être lu en intégralité sur Cairn]

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Mots-clés

Expériences, Problème de Duhem-Quine, Hypothèses auxiliaires