Sommaire
Résumé
L’agent économique est souvent par définition considéré comme un pur égoïste. Plus encore, son utilité est définie sur ce qu’il consomme et elle est considérée comme monotone – ce que nous appelons être « égoïste ». Dans cet article, nous nous intéressons à l’hypothèse selon laquelle le marché conduit les individus à être égoïstes. Nous avançons tout d’abord que la théorie économique n’est pas limitée à considérer des agents économiques égoïstes mais qui peuvent également faire des choix fondés sur d’autres motivations, par exemple des agents qui ont des préférences altruistes envers les autres. Dans une deuxième partie de cet article, nous discutons plusieurs expériences en économie qui traitent des conditions dans lesquelles les préférences altruistes peuvent se manifester. Dans ce contexte, nous discutons en particulier trois aspects: la concurrence, la complétude des contrats et la différence entre l’argent gagnée et l’argent inattendue (ou « windfall money »). Ces trois facteurs, sous des circonstances particulières, semblent contribuer à l’observation de comportements plus égoïstes. Nous concluons que le fait de gagner de l’argent par sa propre activité et la responsabilité jouent un rôle spécifique dans la prévalence des comportement égoistes.
Plan
- Introduction
- The economic agent’s motives
- Competition, complete contracts and earned money – do they make the economic agent more selfish?
- Concluding Remarks
Article
[L’article peut être lu en intégralité sur Cairn]
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Mots-clés
Agent économique, Egoïsme, Préférences altruistes, Concurrence, Monnaie gagnée Vs Monnaie inattendue